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mAbstract: Activity and employment rates for immigrant women in many
industrialised countries display a great variability across national groups. The aim of
this paper is to assess whether this fact is due to a voluntary decision (i.e. large
reservation wages by immigrants) or to an involuntary process (i.e. low labor market
evaluation of their skills). This is done by estimating the reservation wage for each
individual in a sample of immigrant women in Italy. Our results show that low
activity and employment rates for certain national groups are not associated with
high reservation wages. This implies that low participation should not be interpreted
as a voluntary decision.
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The immigrant labor force makes an essential contribution to the growth and develop-
ment of most of the industrialised countries. At the beginning of the 2000s, 85 million
people residing in the OECD countries had been born abroad, almost three times more
than in the 1960s. The share of immigrants over total population is quite high for eco-
nomically advanced countries and it ranges from 6 per cent in Italy to almost 25 per
cent in Canada.
In many European countries, characterised by a rapidly aging population, the eco-
nomic integration of immigrants is a necessary condition for the achievement of the
Lisbon targets of full employment and sustainable growth under the European Employ-
ment Strategy. However, although labor market integration for immigrant men is not
generally an issue, employment rates for women are often low and characterised by
great variability according to country of origin.
There are two possible explanations for this fact. The first is based on “cultural bias”.
For certain nationalities, gender differences in the division of the family burden may
play an important role in the labor supply. In other words, traditions may relegate
women to the more traditional roles and tasks of housekeeping and child-raising. The
second is a skill mismatch on the labor market. In this case, immigrants are willing to
work outside the family but their human capital does not satisfy local employers’
requirements.
The aim of this paper is to disentangle these two effects by assessing the impact of
cultural background on women’s decision to participate in the labor market. In2013 Accetturo and Infante; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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activity rates across nationalities is attributable to a cultural or a skill effect by estimat-
ing individual reservation wages.
We make use of an extremely rich database compiled by the non-governmental
organization Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicità - ISMU (Initiatives and Studies on
Multiethnic Society) from surveys of immigrants from the least developed, emerging
and transition countries now resident in the region of Lombardy in the North-West of
Italy. The fact that the interviews are collected in the same (relatively small) area of
Italy is particularly useful for our analysis. Interviewees should face the same labor mar-
ket conditions; moreover, given Italy’s recent tradition in immigration, they are most
likely to preserve their cultural attitudes with respect to labor market participation.
The integration of immigrant women in the labor market is particularly important
for policy making. If the cultural bias explanation were true, the best response for a
policy maker willing to raise the labor market participation would be focusing on the
borders: visas should be issued mainly to the nationalities that are more willing to par-
ticipate in the labor market. In the case of skill mismatch, instead, the policy options
are more complex and may range from selective migration for immigrants whose char-
acteristics are more compatible with the host country’s needs to labor market policies
aimed at educating and training workers to help them become more suited to local
labor market requirements.
This paper relates to the very large literature on the assimilation of immigrants in the
host labor markets. This literature aims at establishing two main facts: whether there is
a gap in the labor market performances (in terms of wages, employment opportunities
etc.) between natives and immigrants and how these evolve over time 1.
Using German data Constant and Massey (2003) find that an assimilation process is
at work: once in the host country, immigrants tend to start a process of human capital
accumulation that reduce the gap with respect to natives; the authors, however, also
highlight a significant disparity in wages between genders. In the UK, Clark and Lindley
(2006) find a relevant heterogeneity among ethnic groups: non-white immigrants show
a lower dynamics in wages compared with white immigrants. For Spain, Amuedo-
Dorantes and de la Rica (2006) report a significant difference in the probability to be
employed for immigrants: the employment gap is even larger when gender is accounted
for, along with immigrants’ origin.
However, the assimilation of immigrants has also relevant non-economic aspects.
Bisin et al. (2008) show that Muslims integrate less with respect to non-Muslims in
UK, a feature that appears to be smoothed, but still significant, in second-generation
immigrants.
The role of culture has been particularly underlined in the analysis of economic as-
similation of immigrant women. Compared with the native group, many studies
(Dustmann and Schmidt, 2000; Constant et al., 2006; Bevelander and Groeneveld, 2007;
Dustmann and Fabbri, 2005; Adsera and Chiswick, 2007) find that the probability to
work for an immigrant woman is significantly lower even after controlling for observ-
able characteristics. This is generally attributed to an unbalanced family burden and a
cultural bias. Moreover, as Dustmann and Schmidt (2000) point out, the same motives
also prevent women from accumulating human capital. By using the British Time Use
Survey, Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2007) obtained a similar result for the UK and
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religious activities and food management than white females. The poor labor market
outcomes by foreign women is usually attributed to culture or religion. For the US,
Fernandez and Fogli (2009) find that intergenerational transmission of cultural attitudes
helps to explain the low contribution to the labor forces by second generation immi-
grant women. Vella (1994) obtains a similar result for educational choices. Heineck
(2004) confirms the influence of religion, finding that the frequent attendance of places
of worship reduces female participation in the labor market in Germany.
This paper aims at contributing to the literature on the effects of culture on the eco-
nomic performance of immigrant women. However, compared with the previous litera-
ture, we aim at disentangling between demand (skill) and supply (cultural) components
in the decision to participate in the labor market. This is a novelty since most of the
existing papers just correlate the immigrant’s cultural attitude to the labor market
performance.
Our results show that culture has a low impact on the decision to work by immigrant
women in Lombardy. Low activity and employment rates for certain national groups
(mainly those from North African, the Middle East and central Asian) are involuntary
since their estimated reservation wages are no greater than those of nationalities
characterised by higher employment levels (for example, Central and Eastern Euro-
peans) 2.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the ISMU dataset and shows some
of the descriptive statistics; Section 3 explains the most relevant econometric issues;
Section 4 presents the results; Section 5 concludes the paper. Appendix 1 shows how coun-
tries of origin are aggregated into clusters of nations while Appendix 2 presents a compari-
son between our estimated reservation wages and labor Force Survey (LFS) data.2. Data
Our main data source is a dataset collected by the ISMU in Lombardy (with the financial
support of the Lombardy regional government and other private institutions) in the period
2001-2005. Since 2001, the ISMU has conducted a yearly survey of immigrants living in
Lombardy. As for migration studies, the dataset has a strong comparative advantage. Its
most important characteristic is that it is also able to collect information for undocumented
aliens due to its data-collection process based on the method of aggregation centres devel-
oped by Blangiardo (1993).
Survey design - Surveys on aggregation centres are specifically designed to collect infor-
mation on a representative sample of immigrants that include also irregular migrants. The
idea is that even undocumented individuals generally lead a social life by attending, for ex-
ample, places of religious worship or cultural centres. Blangiardo’s method hinges on those
centres and is based on a three-stage design. In the first, the ISMU interviewers allocate the
total number of questionnaires (roughly 8,000 each year) across the 11 provinces into which
Lombardy is partitioned; this is aimed at obtaining significant estimates at provincial level
by having roughly the same sample variability within each province. In the second stage, the
ISMU selects a number of representative municipalities (slightly less than 350, almost 25
per cent of all the towns in Lombardy) in each province according to the social and eco-
nomic characteristics of the area. In the third stage, the ISMU interviewers visit all possible
Accetturo and Infante IZA Journal of Migration 2013, 2:2 Page 4 of 21
http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/2aggregation centres for immigrants within each municipality and randomly meet the poten-
tial interviewees. The aggregation centres usually fall within 11 categories: help and counsel-
ling centres for immigrants, Italian language courses for foreigners, places of worship,
healthcare centres, cultural centres, phone/money transfer centres, public offices (police sta-
tions, town halls, etc.), ethnic restaurants/bars, ethnic shopping centres, other (train sta-
tions, etc.) 3. Within each aggregation centre, the ISMU interviews usually have the support
of the leading personalities of the centres (priests, shop owners etc.); this ensures that the
interviewers are seen as “trusted” people and not public officials. As for the ability of the
survey to truly detect irregular immigrants, the misreporting of legal status seems tiny. In
order to provide a comparison between the ISMU estimates and actual data, we compare
survey results with the most recent alternative dataset based on applications for
regularization under the Bossi-Fini amnesty law of 2002. In that year, 144,369 individuals
applied in Lombardy (647,000 in Italy as a whole): this indicates that at least the 31 per cent
of the total foreign population in Lombardy was irregular in 2002. ISMU estimates for that
year do not appear far off that figure: in the 2002 wave, self-declared illegal aliens repre-
sented 27 per cent of the sample.
Dataset description - This study uses five pooled waves from 2001 to 2005. We
concentrate on women of working age (i.e. the 15-64 cohorts), which leaves us
with roughly 12 thousand individuals. The ISMU data contain information on so-
cial and economic characteristics. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the
variables used in the empirical analysis. Average schooling is quite high (10.7 years)
4 and comparable with the figures for the Italian population. Almost 60 per cent
of the interviewed women is married; they have been residing in Italy for a rela-
tively short period of time (5.7 years). Irregular women make up 11.7 per cent of
the total. As for religion, more than two thirds of the dataset is Catholic or
Muslim. Other Christians (mainly Greek-Orthodox) are slightly more than one fifth
of the sample. Table 1 also provides the distribution of immigrants according to
the groups of country of origin (see Appendix 1 for the list of countries belonging
to each group). Almost 30 per cent of the immigrant women come from European
countries; sizeable groups are also constituted by Central and South Americans
and people coming from the Near East and North Africa.
Standard figures on employment status are reported in Table 2, 5 which shows,
as is usual in many industrialised countries, that there is considerable heterogeneity
in labor market outcomes according to the country of origin. The employment rate
averages 60 per cent for the entire sample, while the activity rate is much larger
(73.4 per cent). The employment rate of the women coming from the Central and
Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and Central and South America is roughly
two-thirds higher than that for the Near East and North African countries
(NENAC) 6. The figure for the Central Asia group is even smaller. Activity rates
display the same great variability across national groups.
Representativeness - A relevant concern for working on non-administrative data re-
lates the representativeness of the dataset. In order to address this issue, we compare
the main ISMU data characteristics with those of the labor Force Survey (LFS) for the
North of Italy (where Lombardy is located and where most of the immigrants in Italy
live, 2006-2008 averages) 7. The main relevant difference between ISMU and LFS is in
the country of origin composition: in LFS the share of women coming from CEEC is
Table 1 Summary statistics of the main variables
No. Obs. Sample mean Std. Dev.
School 11,852 10.746 4.541
Potential Experience 11,852 16.764 9.295
Years in Italy 11,989 5.734 4.610
Net monthly wage 9,988 606.874 1214.336
Children below 18yrs 12,015 0.696 0.990
Children above 18yrs 12,015 0.527 1.566
Married 12,015 0.569 0.495
Family network 4,851 0.358 0.479
Family reunification visa 9,914 0.226 0.441









No creed 12,015 5.52
Groups of countries of origin:
Central and Eastern European Countries 12,015 28.56
Central or Southern America 12,015 19.55
Near East and North Africa 12,015 18.29
Sub-Saharan Africa 12,015 15.59
East Asia 12,015 12.44
Central Asia 12,015 5.57
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset.
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the two sources is quite sizeable and this could raise some issues related to the external
validity of the analyses. However, it should be noted that all other population characteristics
are quite similar. The average schooling is 10.2 years in the LFS. The activity rate is slightly
lower (65 per cent) probably due to the different definitions of working status between LFSTable 2 Activity and employment rates across national groups
Activity rate Employment rate
Central and Eastern European Countries 82.0 70.1
Central or Southern America 86.9 73.9
Near East and North Africa 49.7 41.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 78.3 66.0
East Asia 77.1 71.1
Central Asia 38.2 29.8
Total 73.4 62.8
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset.
Activity and employment rates are computed on self-declared working status. Averages weighted according to the
sample design.
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served, for example the NENAC group in the LFS survey still maintain a huge gap in the ac-
tivity rate in comparison with CEEC group (20 percentage points).3. Empirical approach
3.1. How do economists obtain reservation wages?
The aim of this paper is to report an econometric estimate of the immigrants’ reservation
wages. In job search theory, the reservation wage is the lowest offered wage that an un-
employed individual looking for work is prepared to accept (see Blundell and MaCurdy,
1999) 8. Although this is a crucial variable in the neoclassical theory of labor supply, there is
still an open discussion on the best way to estimate it. Two prevailing methods are usually
available in literature.
The first is based upon surveys in which unemployed respondents are directly asked
what their reservation wage is 9. This information is widely used in many studies: see,
among others, Addison et al. (2004, 2010) and, for the Italian case, Sestito and Viviano
(2011). The reliability of this information, however, is widely debated. As shown by
Burdett and Vishwanath (1988) and Hofler and Murphy (1994), self-reported reserva-
tion wages are often biased and they are usually inconsistent with the actual behaviour
of a worker. As Addison et al. (2010) point out, this is mainly due to the fact that re-
spondents usually answer by indicating the prevailing wage on the labor market, rather
than their true reservation value.
The second method treats reservation wages as unobservables, that must be inferred
econometrically by the actual behaviour of a worker. This was pioneered by Heckman
(1974) in his contribution on women’s shadow prices in the labor market and was sub-
sequently developed in further studies (see, Kiefer and Neumann, 1979, 1981; Fishe,
1982; Ferber and Green, 1985; Duncan, 1992; Sharpe and Abdel-Ghany, 1997). The idea
is that observed wages for employed individuals are those that succeed in exceeding the
individual reservation values. This implies that, by controlling for the selectivity bias,
actual market wages contain enough information to infer workers’ reservation wages 10.
In this paper we adopt the second methodology for two main reasons. The first
relates upon the above-mentioned reliability problems of self-reported reservation
wages – problems that can be greatly aggravated for migrants, whose understanding of
the crucial features of the local labor market is more limited. The second relates to the
availability of sufficient observations in the LFS. In Appendix 2 we provide the results
for self-reported reservation wages in the Italian LFS. By concentrating on immigrants
living in the North, we end up with just under 1,000 individuals, which is one-tenth of
our baseline estimation sample.
The methodology we use in this paper is based on the Mohanty’s (2005) extension of
the Heckman model with frictional unemployment and feedbacks between labor de-
mand and supply. As will soon be clearer, from a technical point of view, the only dif-
ference between this methodology and Heckman’s lies in the first stage, which is
bivariate-probit rather than probit estimated. This allows us to take into account a
double selectivity bias due to involuntary unemployment or feedback effects between
demand and supply 11.
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A woman i decides to participate in the labor market (i.e. to be active) whenever the
wage offers she expects to receive are greater than her own reservation wage. In formu-
las, this implies that she is active whenever wi
0–wi
r = y1i ≥ 0, where w
o
i is the expected
wage offer, wri is her reservation wage and y1i represents the (normalised) individual
preference for labor market participation. Whenever y1i is greater than zero, individual
i participates to the labor market, whenever it is negative she prefers to stay at home. It
immediately follows that reservation wages can be obtained as wi
r = wi
0–y1i and can be
computed by estimating preferences (y1i) and wage offers (w
o
i ).
Estimates for y1i and w
o
i are obtained in two steps.
In the first step we consider both the participation decision and the hiring process in
the labor market. Woman i is employed only if she decides to participate in the labor
market (Participatei =1) and is hired by an employer (Employedi = 1). Formally,
Participatei ¼ 1 if y1i≥00 if y1i < 0

and
Employedi ¼ 1 if y2i≥00 if y2i < 0

where y2i represents the (normalised) employers’ preferences over individual i.
The aim of the first step is to compute the latent variables y1 and y2 by estimating
the following two equations:
y1¼ x1b1þe1 ð1Þ
y2¼ x2b2þe2 ð2Þ
by a bivariate probit with partial observability. The choice of the bivariate probit is par-
ticularly useful since it allows us to treat demand and supply components simultan-
eously. As mentioned above, this allows us to take into account the existence of
feedbacks between the decision to participate and the expected labor market outcome.
Operationally, x1 contains a set of variables aimed at capturing the economic and cul-
tural determinants for the labor supply, while x2 includes all the possible personal char-
acteristics which are likely to influence the employer’s willingness to hire an individual.
As for the supply components, x1 includes schooling, potential experience, religion
dummies and their interaction with marital status, number of children below and above
18 years of age and a set of time dummies. The number of under age children may in-
dicate a greater interest for childcare and housekeeping while the number of children
over 18 should have a positive effect on the labor supply since offspring could need fi-
nancial support from the family of origin. Religion dummies indicate a cultural attitude
toward labor, especially when a woman is married. As will be clear later, religion dum-
mies play a fundamental role as identification variables in the empirical strategy.
On the demand side, x2 contains schooling, years since migration, dummies for coun-
try of origin, time, and space 12. Years since migration are expected to enhance the
probability for a worker to be employed since during these years the worker is likely to
increase his ability to understand the crucial features of the host country’s labor market
and local language; 13 country dummies capture the workers’ heterogeneity in terms of
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sectoral specialization) while spatial dummies capture time invariant local characteris-
tics that are likely to influence employment levels.
x1 and x2 share the schooling variable and time dummies, since education is likely to
have an effect on both the demand and supply components and year dummies take into
consideration business cycle fluctuations.
The latent variable of interest (ŷ1) is calculated by taking the predicted values (linear
prediction) of equation (1).
In the second step, we compute expected wage offers. We estimate the following
wage equation using a correction for a double selectivity bias (Tunali, 1986):
lnwmi ¼ αþ b3x3 þ c13λ1i þ c23λ2i þ Ds þ Dt þ Dc þ ui ð3Þ
where ui = εi − c13λ1i − c23λ2i, λ1i ¼




F x1ib1;x2ib2;ρð Þ and λ2i ¼




F x1ib1;x2ib2;ρð Þ . φ and
Φ represent, respectively, the density and the cumulative function of a univariate stand-
ard normal distribution, F denotes the bivariate standard normal distribution, while ρ
(rho) is the correlation of the error terms in the bivariate probit. x3 includes standard
variables in migration-augmented mincerian equations: schooling, potential experience
and years since migration. The regression includes spatial dummies (Ds) to take into ac-
count spatial differences in wage levels; time dummies (Dt) to control for business cycle
effects. Country of origin dummies (Dc) control for institutional factors such as educa-
tional quality (inserting area dummies deliver very similar results).
Expected wage offers are computed as follows:




oWhere lnw is the predicted value of equation (3). w^ represents the expected
market wage conditional on the individual characteristics and controlling for the select-
ivity bias due to participation and hiring decisions 14.
Reservation wages can now be calculated as w^r¼ w^0y^1 for all the individuals in the
sample.
By comparing all the variables in x1, x2 and x3, the crucial role of religion dummies
and their interaction with marital status as identification variables is now apparent. The
idea is that religion is a private matter that affects the individual working decisions but
should not affect the labor market evaluation (wages) and the hiring decision by a non-
discriminating employer. In other words, the worker’s productivity should be influenced
by the country of origin’s institutional setting (school quality, sectoral specialization
etc.) but not by the migrant’s private attitudes toward religion (which does, however, in-
fluence her decision to work). This implies that by inserting country dummies in equa-
tions (2) and (3) we estimate a supply effect that is within-country and across religions.
This can be done only if we have an imperfect overlap between religions and countries
of origin, i.e. when there are different religious creeds within a country. In order to
have a suitable sample for this identification we exclude all individuals coming from a
country where, according to the ISMU dataset, only one creed is professed. The list of
a diversification indicator of religions (Herfindhal index: HI15) in each country is
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we exclude all countries with a HI equal to one.
A possible challenge to the identification of equations (1), (2) and (3) is the presence
of occupations in which foreigners coming from the same nation tend to cluster (Patel
and Vella, 2007). This would invalidate the cross-country comparison since reservation
wages are driven by cross-nation sector of specialization and the mobility is low.
Ideally, this would be solved by inserting sector dummies in equation (3); however, in
this case the computation of wage offers for not-employed immigrants would be im-
possible since predicted values cannot be calculated for unemployed and inactive. It
should be noted, however, country dummies in equation (2) and (3) take also into ac-
count differentiated search networks and their effects on wages, thus limiting the rele-
vance of these concerns. In a robustness check, we calculate reservation wages for
employed individuals by inserting sector dummies with results much in line with the
one presented here 16.
3.3. Cross-country differences and robustness
After computing the reservation wages, we test whether they systematically differ
across groups of nationalities. We calculate the percentage differences between each
group and a reference cluster. Our first choice would have been native women. How-
ever since the ISMU dataset only concentrates on immigrants, we chose the CEEC
(Central and Eastern European Countries) group. The choice of CEEC as a benchmark
relies on the fact that they share similar institutions with the host country and are gen-
erally seen as a reference group in the assimilation patterns in most countries 17. We
focus on the differences between the CEEC group and two nationalities that display the
lowest activity and employment rates: NENAC and Central Asia. If the reservation
wages for those groups were higher, the observed low labor market participation would
be interpreted as voluntary: the value NENAC and Central Asian women attach to their
time spent at home is so high that they are not attracted by the local labor market.
Conversely, if their reservation wages were comparable or lower to that of our refer-
ence group, their inactive status would be interpreted as involuntary: their reservation
values are not particularly high but they remain unemployed because the arrival rate of
job offers is quite low.
We further check the robustness of these estimates along four lines.
The first check is based on Italian migration law according to which it is necessary to
have a job in order to obtain a visa. As an exception to this rule, immigrants can enter
Italy to join their family and obtain a visa based on family reunification. For those
cases, migrants’ true shadow values should be revealed since they do not need to work
to obtain a residence permit. We check this issue by restricting the analysis to those
women who migrated to Italy with a family reunification visa. This information is avail-
able for all years except for 2004: migrants entering the country for with a family reuni-
fication visa amount to 2,408.
The previous scheme obviously implies that the immigrants have a good knowledge
of the Italian migration laws. We can generalise it by focussing on migrants with a
blood relative already residing in the country at migration time. Again, for those indi-
viduals their shadow values could be higher, since they can rely on the family's financial
support while looking for work. We check this issue by restricting the analysis to
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leaves us with 1,753 individuals.
The third check is based on the analysis of the irregular migrants. Undocumented
aliens have very weak bargaining power with respect to their employers as they cannot
join a union and must work off the books. This implies that wage offers are usually
quite low (Accetturo and Infante, 2010) and, therefore, they may be quite close to the
reservation wages. Moreover, illegal aliens’ incentives to work are particularly strong
since their only chance of being regularised under one of the recurrent amnesties is
strictly linked to evidence that they are employed on Italian soil. In other words, they
are more likely to accept the jobs they are offered. In the ISMU dataset, irregular
women are surveyed each year and they amount to 1,303 individuals.
The fourth check is based on the relationship between religions and countries. As we
said before, we already discard all the observations coming from one-religion countries.
However, in some countries a religion could prevail but not be the only one (for ex-
ample, Islam in Arab countries or Roman Catholicism in Central and South America);
this implies that from the employer’s point of view religions and countries of origin are
quite indistinguishable thus invalidating our identification structure. We cope with this
problem by restricting our analysis to a group of countries that can be considered truly
multi-religious. This is done by discarding all observations coming from countries
whose HI based on religions exceeds 0.75: this leaves us with 8,305 individuals.
4. Results
4.1. Baseline sample
The first part of this section is devoted to the results of the baseline sample. This group
is constituted by all the regular women of working age interviewed in the 2001-2005
waves.
Table 3 shows the results of both the bivariate probit estimates (columns [1] and [2])
and the wage equation (column [3]). As expected, schooling positively affects the prob-
ability to be active and to be employed in the labor market. Moreover, potential experi-
ence increases the probability to supply labor and the years spent in Italy increases the
likelihood to be employed. The number of children below (above) 18 years old reason-
ably raise (decrease) the probability to be active. Estimates also show that the correl-
ation among error terms (rho) is quite high 18.
In the second step, we estimate a classical wage equation for all working individuals
and we take into account the possible selection bias by plugging the computed λ1 and
λ2 into the equation. Results are displayed in column [3]. All variables have the
expected sign and are significant. The highly significant coefficients of λ1 and λ2 imply
that selection is at work. The use of estimated values of columns [1] and [3] allows us
to compute reservation wages.
Before starting with the comparison across national groups it is worth assessing
whether estimated reservation wages are consistent with the predictions of the standard
theory of labor supply (Table 4). As Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) point out, individuals
with a higher inter-temporal elasticity of substitution should have lower reservation
wages: this is confirmed in our estimates since younger individuals attach a lower eco-
nomic value to time spent at home compared with older cohorts. Even education plays
an important role in setting the individual's reservation value. Consistently with the
Table 3 Baseline sample
[1] [2] [3]









School 0.039*** 0.024*** 0.007***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
Potential experience 0.043*** - 0.009***
(0.005) (0.002)
(Potential experience)2 (x100) −0.069*** - −0.021***
(0.011) (0.000)
Years in Italy - 0.101*** 0.016***
(0.009) (0.005)
(Years in Italy)2 (x100) - −0.415*** −0.047*
(0.051) (0.025)
Children below 18yrs 0.045** - −0.058***
(0.021) (0.007)
Children above 18yrs −0.088*** - −0.022***
(0.016) (0.006)
Marital status −0.554*** - −0.046**
(0.066) (0.014)
Spatial dummies NO Local labor system Local labor system
Year dummies YES YES YES
Religion dummies and their
interaction with the marital status
YES NO NO
Country of origin dummies NO YES YES
Lambda1 - - −0.171**
(0.068)
Lambda2 - - −0.163**
(0.074)
Intercept 0.231** −0.492*** 7.100***
(0.103) (0.119) (0.089)
Rho 0.916 -
No. Obs. 10,459 5,937
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Wage equation standard error take into account the two-step procedure. Stars
show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, ** between 1 per cent and 5 per cent, * between 5 per cent and 10 per
cent. All regressions are weighted according to the sample design.
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http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/2standard theory, we find that more educated individuals usually set higher reservation
wages. Finally we check whether individuals residing in a city19 have a lower reservation
value because of lower job-search costs thanks to better access to the transportation
network. This is confirmed by the bottom panel, in which we show reservation wages
for workers in a city by educational group.
How reasonable are these estimates? We compare our measure of reservation wage with
self reported value (as it appears in the Italian LFS, see Table 5): the results are surprisingly
similar. In particular, NENAC and Central Asia groups still have a tendency toward a low


















Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset.
Means are weighted according to the sample design.
A woman is considered to be living in a city if she resides in one of the towns belonging to the local labor markets of
Milan, Brescia and Bergamo.
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http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/2rank. Our benchmark group reports the highest reservation wage, still with a high participa-
tion ratio to the labor market.
We subsequently deal with the core estimates of the paper. In Table 6 we analyse the res-
ervation wages and their differences across national groups. Columns [1] and [2] show the
activity and employment rates for the baseline sample (regular aliens),20 the last column re-
ports the percentage difference of the reservation wage of a national group with respect to
the CEEC.
Estimates show that while the share of active and working population is substantially
low for the NENAC and Central Asia group, their reservation wages are statistically
smaller than those computed for the CEEC group. This suggests that low participation
should not be attributed to a cultural attitude that raises the economic value of the
time spent at home, but, rather, to a skill mismatch between local labor market require-
ments and immigrants’ abilities.Table 5 Comparison between lfs and our estimates
[1] [2]
LFS Our estimates
Central and Eastern European Countries 832.93 780.03
Central or Southern America 816.22 797.43
Near East and North Africa 728.55 754.16
Sub-Saharan Africa 731.42 811.01
East Asia 741.45 781.28
Central Asia 788.53 715.12
Source: Authors’ calculations on LFS and ISMU dataset.







Percentage difference with respect to the
CEEC group:
Central and Eastern European
Countries
79.8 69.9
Central or Southern America 85.3 73.4 0.029***
(0.006)
Near East and North Africa 47.0 40.5 −0.096***
(0.007)
Sub-Saharan Africa 76.4 66.6 −0.003
(0.007)
East Asia 76.9 71.2 0.045***
(0.009)
Central Asia 35.1 27.5 −0.143***
(0.011)
No. Obs. 10,459
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset.
(1) Percentage differences in computed reservation wages. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, **
between 1 per cent and 5 per cent, * between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Mean differences are weighted according to
the sample design.
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http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/2We further split the computed reservation wages across educational levels and years
since migration.
Table 7 shows the differentiated effects across four classes of education: no education,
primary, secondary and tertiary schooling. Baseline results are confirmed as reservation
wages for NENAC and Central Asian are always statistically lower than the estimate for
the CEEC. In columns [1] to [4] of Table 8 we report the percentage differences in res-
ervation wages for subgroups belonging to (respectively) the first to the fourth quartile of
the distribution of years since migration. Even in this case the results remain undisputed.
4.2. Robustness
So far we have obtained the interesting result that the low employment/activity rates
registered for certain groups are not associated with higher reservation wages.
In this section we present four robustness checks by restricting the analysis to: (i)
women benefitting from a visa based on family reunification, (ii) immigrants with a
blood relative at the time of migration to the host country, (iii) undocumented immi-
grants, and (iv) immigrants coming from truly multi-religious countries.
Results for the first check are shown in Table 9. Columns [1] and [2] report, respect-
ively, the shares of active and working population among those who entered with a
family reunification visa: consistently with the standard theory of labor supply, activity
and employment rates are quite small now, thus reflecting their possibility to sustain
larger spells of unemployment;21 however, there are still differences across national
groups. In column [3] we report the estimated reservation wage. Baseline results are
still confirmed: NENAC and Central Asia are among the lowest participant group in
the labor market, while the reservation wage in this subsample is also the lowest for
Table 7 Reservation wage differentials across educational levels (baseline sample)









Percentage difference with respect to
the CEEC group:
Central or Southern America 0.054 0.042*** 0.022** −0.002
(0.038) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015)
Near East and North Africa −0.021 −0.026* −0.082*** −0.074***
(0.027) (0.013) (0.010) (0.016)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.052* 0.071*** 0.040*** −0.075***
(0.029) (0.014) (0.011) (0.020)
East Asia −0.040 −0.001 0.026** 0.011
(0.042) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015)
Central Asia −0.039 −0.102*** −0.116*** −0.137***
(0.033) (0.018) (0.017) (0.033)
No. Obs. 964 3702 4273 1520
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset.
Percentage differences in computed reservation wages. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, ** between 1
per cent and 5 per cent, * between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Mean differences are weighted according to the
sample design.
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http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/2the Central Asian women, and statistically equivalent to the benchmark group for the
NENAC women. A very similar picture is depicted in Table 10, which shows the esti-
mates for immigrants with a blood relative already residing in Italy.
Estimates for the irregulars are reported in Table 11. Columns [1] and [2] (activity
and employment rates) show that incentives to work are particularly strong for the ir-
regulars. Activity rate averages around 90 per cent, while the employment rate is much
lower (64 per cent). Cross-national differences are still in place, especially in the em-
ployment rates, although they narrow with respect to the baseline sample. However,
our baseline result on reservation wages remains undisputed: the difference in reserva-
tion wages is negative and statistically significant for the NENAC group, while negative
but not significant for Central Asian migrants.
Finally, Table 12 tackles the issue of the multi-religious countries. As explained above,
even in nations with an HI based on religions smaller than one, we can observe the
prevalence of one religion that can invalidate our identification strategy. To address this
concern, we only consider countries with an HI lower than 0.75. Results remain quite
similar to the baseline ones, thus confirming the correctness of the identification
strategy.5. Concluding remarks
As in many advanced countries, activity and employment rates for immigrant
women in Italy display great variability across nationals groups. Some nationalities
(NENAC, Central Asia), in particular, are characterised by extremely low participa-
tion in the labor market. This fact can be due to either a supply “cultural” or a
demand “skill” effect. The aim of this paper is to disentangle these two compo-
nents by estimating the economic value of the time spent at home (reservation
wages).
Table 8 Reservation wage differentials across years since migration (baseline sample)









Percentage difference with respect to the CEEC
group:
Central or Southern America 0.017 0.008 0.015 0.030**
(0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Near East and North Africa −0.063*** −0.064*** −0.120*** −0.064***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.030 −0.040*** −0.045*** 0.061***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
East Asia −0.029 0.010 −0.022 0.008
(0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Central Asia −0.071*** −0.171*** −0.159*** −0.104***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024)
No. Obs. 1901 2601 2855 3102
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset.
Percentage differences in computed reservation wages. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, ** between 1
per cent and 5 per cent, * between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Mean differences are weighted according to the
sample design.
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http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/2From a technical point of view, we use religion as an identification variable for the ef-
fects of culture on labor supply in multi-religious countries. Our results show that low
activity and employment rates for NENAC and Central Asia are not associated with
higher reservation wages; this implies that low migrant participation is attributable to a







Percentage difference with respect to the
CEEC group:
Central and Eastern European
Countries
54.4 42.8
Central or Southern America 68.1 55.3 0.067***
(0.023)
Near East and North Africa 27.0 22.6 0.015
(0.016)
Sub-Saharan Africa 52.8 47.5 0.025
(0.020)
East Asia 53.0 50.5 −0.025
(0.021)
Central Asia 28.6 16.5 −0.063***
(0.022)
No. Obs. 2,408
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset.
(1) Percentage differences in computed reservation wages. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, **
between 1 per cent and 5 per cent, * between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Mean differences are weighted according to
the sample design.







Percentage difference with respect to the
CEEC group:
Central and Eastern European
Countries
60.8 45.4
Central or Southern America 72.1 65.7 −0.0126
(0.0128)
Near East and North Africa 24.7 19.9 −0.0234**
(0.00986)
Sub-Saharan Africa 51.7 44.3 0.0248**
(0.0110)
East Asia 66.6 60.1 0.0108
(0.0133)
Central Asia 24.5 16.0 −0.0438***
(0.0130)
No. Obs. 1,753
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset.
(1) Percentage differences in computed reservation wages. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, **
between 1 per cent and 5 per cent, * between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Mean differences are weighted according to
the sample design.
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http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/2This result is quite robust to a number of sample selections and specification tests. In
particular, the reservation wage differentials do not change according to the mode of
entry into the host country (visa based on family reunification or the presence of blood
relatives) or to legal status within the host country.
This result can hardly be overlooked and it may have some important policy implica-
tions. As low participation is mainly involuntary, policymakers have a set of policies
that can be used to raise participation and employment rates. The first option is related
to selective migration. As far as the policymakers are concerned, with a quantitative
target (e.g. Lisbon criteria), admissions could be aimed at those nationalities whose cap-
abilities to integrate are particularly high. The policy, in this case, could also be
designed to require different educational levels for different countries of origin. Alter-
natively, for the nationalities whose skills are particularly mismatched, the policymaker
can think of stricter educational requirements. The second set of options relates to pol-
icies for labor market inclusions. The idea is to create a set of training programmes
with the aim of helping immigrants to become more suited to local labor market
requirements.Endnotes
1 The literature on the assimilation of migrants is actually huge. Past and more rele-
vant contributions are Chiswick (1978), Borjas (1985), and Friedberg (2000). For Italy,
see Brandolini et al. (2005) and Accetturo and Infante (2010).
2 The result is opposite to that found by Niesing et al. (1994). By analysing the high
unemployment rates of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, they conclude many







Percentage difference with respect to the
CEEC group:
Central and Eastern European
Countries
91.6 61.4
Central or Southern America 94.8 74.6 0.087***
(0.031)
Near East and North Africa 86.9 56.4 −0.251***
(0.045)
Sub-Saharan Africa 92.0 59.6 −0.078**
(0.037)
East Asia 85.5 72.6 0.028
(0.052)
Central Asia 88.8 57.7 −0.153
(0.103)
No. Obs. 1,303
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset.
(1) Percentage differences in computed reservation wages. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, **
between 1 per cent and 5 per cent, * between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Mean differences are weighted according to
the sample design.







Percentage difference with respect to the
CEEC group:
Central and Eastern European
Countries
79.8 69.9
Central or Southern America 84.0 71.0 0.0296
(0.0301)
Near East and North Africa 31.0 27.7 −0.482***
(0.0470)
Sub-Saharan Africa 76.6 66.8 0.0893***
(0.0286)
East Asia 76.9 71.2 −0.0319
(0.0303)
Central Asia 35.1 27.5 −0.495***
(0.0401)
No. Obs. 8,305
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset.
(1) Percentage differences in computed reservation wages. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, **
between 1 per cent and 5 per cent, * between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Mean differences are weighted according to
the sample design.
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http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/2national groups suffer from a “discrimination in employment possibilities” due to em-
ployer choices.
3 See Accetturo and Infante (2010) for a detailed description of the aggregation
centres.
4 As usual in this literature, we assigned zero years of schooling when the individual
does not have any formal education, 8 years for a compulsory school leaving certificate,
13 years for high school and 17 for at least a university degree.
5 To be clear, we split the immigrants in three groups as regards employment status.
The first comprises the inactive population, i.e. those who stated they were housewives
or students. The second group is made up of the self-reported unemployed. The third
is composed of all employed persons. The “active” group includes both unemployed
and employed individuals.
6 A similar finding is reported by Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2006) for Spain,
according to which African women suffer the lowest occupational attainment, with re-
spect to other immigration groups (in particular if taken into account the years since
migration), while Central and South Americans, along with immigrants within EU15,
show high level of assimilation.
7 LFS data are representative for immigration from 2006 on.
8 In a static framework, with quasi-convex utility functions, the reservation wage is
equal to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption.
9 For example, the Italian labor Force Survey asks unemployed workers “What is the
lowest net monthly wage you would be willing to accept?”
10 An important advance on this topic is the estimation of structural search models
by using the panel structure of many LFSs. This method cannot be used in this paper
because the ISMU dataset is compiled on the basis of pooled cross-sections.
11 Mohanty (2005), in turn, generalises the procedure to cases with multiple selection
bias following the approach in Meng and Schmidt (1985). Recently Baffoe-Bonnie
(2009) uses a similar framework to study wage differentials.
12 Spatial dummies include one dummy for each of local labor markets in the parti-
tions of Lombardy.
13 As one referee pointed out, Years in Italy would also enhance the probability of be-
ing willing to work. In a robustness check (available upon request) we inserted this
variable in x1 with results much in line with the baseline specification.
14 Expected wages are also computed for unemployed and inactive individuals. Pre-
dicted values are computed without the country of origin dummies coefficients. In this
way, we net out the effects of wage level differentials on the computed reservation
wages. However, results do not change when we insert country of origin dummies in
the predicted values calculations.






where R is the set of re-
ligions, Prc is the number of immigrants of religion r coming from country c and Pc is
the number of people coming from country c. When in country c there is only one reli-
gion, HI is equal to one.
16 As a referee points out, another challenge to the identification is the possible dis-
crimination according to religion by employers. A simple way to show that this is not
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http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/2likely the case is to run eq. (2) for active women by adding also religion dummies and
their interaction with the marital status (linear probability model). The adj. R-squared
passes from 0.081 to 0.084, with an increase by 3.7 per cent. The same regression with-
out country dummies generates a drop of the adj. R-squared to 0.06 (from 0.084). As a
comparison, we evaluate the importance of religion dummies in eq. (1). Dropping those
variables generates a fall in the adj. R-squared from 0.265 to 0.159 (almost 40 per cent).
This implies that while religion dummies (and their interactions) little add to the total
explained variance of the hiring decisions by firms (4 per cent), they fundamentally
contribute to the total variance of the labor supply decision (40 per cent). We also
made an additional check. The presence of federal and multi-religious countries (like
India) may also possibly create a confounding factor. If religious minorities concen-
trates in a few states, they are likely to influence the schooling system. This implies that
we may have the case in which individuals coming from the same country have a differ-
ent human capital due to heterogeneous educational system. This heterogeneity may be
observed by the employer but not by the econometrician, thus creating a confounding
factor in the estimates. In order to cope with this problem, we exclude from the base-
line sample (made by multi-religious countries) all the federal states, with results much
in line with the baseline. All these results are available upon request.
17 Another option would have been to merge ISMU data with the LFS. We have de-
cided not to go in this direction because of the great differences between the two sur-
veys in terms of data collection and reference population.
18 This is due to the fact that the dependent variables in the biprobit are highly corre-
lated since they only differ in the values they assume for unemployed individuals. This
may generate a collinearity problem between λ1 and λ2 in the estimate of the wage
equation. A possible way to circumvent this problem is to treat equations (1) and (2) in
a sequential way by estimating an Heckprob model. The results, not shown here to save
space but available upon request, are in line with those presented in the text.
19 We define “city” the local labor market of the three most important towns of Lom-
bardy: Milan, Brescia and Bergamo.
20 Reported figures are quite similar to those in Table 2 since the regular aliens con-
stitute almost 90 per cent of the ISMU sample.
21 This result is confirmed by Constant and Zimmermann (2005).
22 The extension to other regions provides very similar results since immigrants in
Italy mostly settle in the North.Appendix
Appendix 1. National groups and countries of origin
(Herfindhal index of religions in parenthesis)
Central and Eastern European Countries: Bulgaria (0.42), Czech Rep. (0.46), Estonia
(0.33), Latvia (0.38), Lithuania (0.36), Poland (0.66), Romania (0.43), Slovakia (0.62),
Slovenia (0.34), Hungary (0.56), Albania (0.30), Belarus (0.70), Bosnia-Herzegovina
(0.34), Croatia (0.33), Serbia-Montenegro (0.34), Macedonia (0.31), Moldova (0.68),
Russia (0.46), Turkey (0.68), Ukraine (0.59).
Central and Southern America: Argentina (0.54), Bahamas (0.55), Barbados (1),
Belize (1), Bolivia (0.88), Brazil (0.67), Chile (1), Colombia (0.77), Costa Rica (0.55),
Cuba (0.40), Dominica (0.78), Dominican Rep. (0.72), Ecuador (0.77), El Salvador (0.58),
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http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/2Jamaica (0.37), Guatemala (1), Haiti (1), Honduras (0.72), Mexico (0.94), Nicaragua (1),
Panama (0.50), Paraguay (0.83), Peru (0.70), Santa Lucia (1), Trinidad and Tobago (1),
Uruguay (0.73), Venezuela (0.58).
Near East and North Africa: Algeria (0.92), Egypt (0.72), Libya (0.76), Morocco (0.81),
Tunisia (0.98), Saudi Arabia (1), UAE (1), Jordan (0.53), Bahrain (1), Iran (0.76),
Iraq (0.50), Kuwait (1), Lebanon (0.61), Palestine (0.34), Syria (0.66), Yemen (0.25).
Sub-Saharan Africa: Angola (0.41), Benin (0.30), Botswana (1), Burkina Faso (0.44),
Burundi (0.45), Cameroon (0.46), Capo Verde (0.73), Central African Rep. (1), Chad,
Comores, Congo (0.37), Congo (Dem. Rep.) (0.57), Côte d’Ivoire (0.47), Eritrea (0.31),
Ethiopia (0.36), Gabon (0.33), Gambia (0.58), Ghana (0.38), Djibouti (1), Guinea (0.51),
Guinea Bissau (0.52), Equatorial Guinea (0.26), Kenya (0.26), Lesotho (0.26),
Liberia (0.25), Madagascar (0.52), Malawi (1), Mali (0.88), Mauritania (0.32), Mauritius
(0.29), Mozambique (0.59), Namibia (1), Niger (0.36), Nigeria (0.38), Rwanda (0.43),
Sao Tome e Principe (1), Seychelles (0.28), Senegal (0.60), Sierra Leone (0.44), Somalia
(0.43), South Africa (1), Sudan (1), Tanzania (0.55), Togo (0.38), Uganda (0.72), Zambia
(0.59), Zimbabwe (0.50).
East Asia: Cambodia (0.30), China (0.30), North Korea (0.26), South Korea (0.37),
Philippines (0.69), Indonesia (0.27), Laos (0.33), Malaysia (0.62), Myanmar (0.50),
Singapore (1), Sri Lanka (0.31), Taiwan (1), Thailand (0.53), Vietnam (1).
Central Asia: Afghanistan (0.5), Armenia (1), Azerbaijan (0.55), Bangladesh (0.68),
Georgia (1), India (0.25), Kazakhstan (0.36), Kyrgyzstan (1), Nepal (1), Pakistan (0.74),
Uzbekistan (0.55).
Appendix 2. A comparison with the self-reported reservation wages in the
Italian labor Force Survey
In this Appendix, we compare our estimates for reservation wages on ISMU data with
those provided in the labor Force Survey (LFS). We use on the 2006-08 waves of LFS,
as previous ones do not provide information on the citizenship of foreign workers.
Moreover, in order to provide a comparable result we concentrate on unemployed fe-
males in the 15-64 age bracket residing in the North of the country, 22 where Lombardy
is located. We provide here the answer to the question “What is the lowest net monthly
wage you would be willing to accept?” Results (Table 5) show that the magnitude for
reservation wages is quite similar across national groups. Moreover, cross-national dif-
ferences in LFS basically mirror those in our estimates.
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